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SUMMARY 
Assessment of safety culture is done predominantly by questionnaire-based 
studies, which tend to reveal attitudes on immaterial characteristics (values, 
beliefs, norms). There is a need for a better understanding of the implications of 
the material aspects of an organization (structures, processes, etc.) for safety 
culture and their interactions with the immaterial characteristics. This paper 
presents a new agent-based organizational modelling approach for integrated 
and systematic evaluation of material and immaterial characteristics of socio-
technical organizations in safety culture analysis. It uniquely considers both the 
formal organization and the value- and belief-driven behaviour of individuals in 
the organization. Results are presented of a model for safety occurrence 
reporting at an air navigation service provider. Model predictions consistent with 
questionnaire-based results are achieved. A sensitivity analysis provides insight 
in organizational factors that strongly influence safety culture indicators. The 
modelling approach can be used in combination with attitude-focused safety 
culture research, towards an integrated evaluation of material and immaterial 
characteristics of socio-technical organizations. By using this approach an 
organization is able to gain a deeper understanding of causes of diverse 
problems and inefficiencies both in the formal organization and in the behaviour 
of organizational agents, and to systematically identify and evaluate 
improvement options. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizational and safety culture are broadly recognized as important for the safety 
of operations in various fields [1][2][3][4][5][6], including Air Traffic Management 
(ATM).  The main aspects of organizational culture are reflected in a definition by 
Uttal [7]: ‘Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that 
interact with a company’s people, organizational structures and control systems to 
produce behavioural norms (the way we do things around here).’ Safety culture aims 
to keep the collective mind of an organization, through its entirety of individual 
minds, continually focused on safety [6]. It has been defined in a variety ways [3]; in 
this paper, we use the term safety culture as those aspects of organizational culture 
that may have an effect on safety, which is in line with Hopkins’ primary focus on 
organizational culture and subsequent analysis of its impact on safety [4]. We also 
follow Hopkins’ argumentation to not distinguish between organizational/safety 
culture versus climate, and we will thus use the term culture also in relation to its 
overt manifestations. Characteristics that are typically linked to safety culture include 
learning culture, reporting culture, just culture, flexibility, communication, safety-
related behaviour, attitudes towards safety, working situation, risk perception, 
teaming, trust, responsibility, commitment and involvement [1][5][6].  
 
As is well reflected in Utal’s definition of organizational culture [7], the values and 
beliefs (commonly) held in an organization interact with its structures and processes, 
and jointly they influence the behaviour of people in the organization. Insofar as 
these people are working at the sharp end (e.g. airline pilots, air traffic controllers, 
physicians) and thus in direct control of potentially hazardous operations, their 
behaviour has a direct effect on the level of safety achieved by the organization. In 
particular, their performance, their interactions with other operators and technical 
systems, and their ways to respond to varying contextual and environmental 
demands contribute to the resilience of the operation and the development of 
safety-relevant situations [8][9]. It is well realized [1][8][10] that the safety achieved 
in an organization also depends on the constraints, resources, incentives and 
demands set, and values and commitments portrayed by people working at the blunt 
end (e.g. managers, regulators, system developers), who determine the working 
conditions of and the requirements set upon the people at the sharp end, and who 
contribute to the organizational culture as a whole and to the safety culture in 
particular.  
Study of the safety culture in an organization can in general be pursued in a variety 
of ways, including questionnaires, checklists, audits, interviews, workshops, 
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ethnographic research and accident inquiries [4][5][6][11][12]. In practice, the 
predominant method is the use of questionnaires that address several safety culture 
characteristics by asking people’s opinions about related values and work issues on 
a preference scale. Such questionnaire-based safety culture research has been 
characterized as attitude research by Guldenmund [13], where an attitude is defined 
as a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with 
some degree of favour or disfavour. In an evaluation of questionnaire-based safety 
culture studies, Guldenmund argues that the dominant factors found in the 
aggregated data sets of such studies can be ascribed to primarily affective 
evaluations of the workforce about its management and the perceived influence of 
management on working conditions rather than of the working conditions 
themselves. Furthermore, he shows that the correlation between thus obtained safety 
culture factors and safety performance indicators is typically quite low [13]. As a way 
forward, he advocates further integration of value aspects in audit tools for 
organizational processes and structures. The need for socio-technical integration in 
safety culture research of material characteristics of the organization (e.g. 
organizational structures and processes) and immaterial characteristics of the 
organization (e.g. values, beliefs and norms) is also stressed by Grote and Künzler 
[14][15]. A good understanding of the relations between these material and 
immaterial characteristics is important for the identification of suitable and robust 
policies to improve and maintain sufficient levels of safety culture in an organization. 
 
The research described in this paper aims to develop new methods for improving the 
understanding of the relations between material and immaterial characteristics in 
socio-technical organizations. To this end we initiated research towards the 
development of organizational models for analysis of safety culture. These models 
should be able to describe organizational structures and processes, socio-technical 
integration, the integration with immaterial characteristics and they should facilitate 
simulations and analysis. A secondary reason for this organizational model 
development is that by future coupling of organizational models with accident risk 
models more explicit descriptions and a better understanding of the relation 
between safety culture and accident risk may be achieved.  
 
The organizational modelling research was done in coordination with safety culture 
survey-based research at EUROCONTROL and was focused on a particular case of 
safety culture issues in relation to the organization of safety occurrence reporting at 
a West-European air navigation service provider (ANSP). The steps, modelling details 
and results of this study are described in a series of reports, which can be accessed 
in Ref. [16]. A companion paper [17] focuses on the technical details of the 
organizational model and the performed simulations. Current paper focuses on the 
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principles of the modelling, its use in safety culture analysis, the model results 
obtained and the coordination and comparison with the safety culture survey 
approach. Section 2 provides a review on organizational modelling. Section 3 
highlights the key features of the development of the organizational model. Section 
4 presents the simulation results of the model and their comparison with safety 
culture survey results. Section 5 presents a discussion of the methods and results. 
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2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
As an onset to the identification of a suitable organizational modelling framework we 
reviewed related literature [18]. This section provides a synopsis of this review that 
helps explaining the choices made. Section 2.1 provides an overview of organization 
theory, Section 2.2 describes organizational modelling methods and Section 2.3 
describes methods on organizational modelling for safety analysis. 
 
2.1 ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Organization theory studies structures and dynamics of human organizations. Its 
research methods stem from a broad range of disciplines such as economics, 
psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology and system theory; related 
practical disciplines include human resources and industrial and organizational 
psychology. Depending on the perspective, various definitions for an organization 
have been formulated in organization theory: 
• An organization is a planned, coordinated and purposeful action of human 
beings to construct or compile a common tangible or intangible product [19];  
• An organization is a social arrangement which pursues collective goals, which 
controls its own performance, and which has a boundary separating it from its 
environment [20]; 
• An organization is a structure that comprises sets of interrelated roles, which are 
intentionally organized to ensure a desired (or required) pattern of activities [21]; 
• An organization is a system that represents an organized collection of parts that 
are highly integrated in order to accomplish an overall goal [22]. 
The definitions in [19][20][21] are formulated from the positions of sociology, the 
definition in Ref. [22] is given from the perspectives of system theory. 
 
Organizations are investigated at different aggregation levels: micro, meso and 
macro levels. The micro level considers the behaviour of individuals and groups in an 
organization and it includes aspects such as perception of an individual in the 
organizational context [20], work motivation and satisfaction [23], the influence of 
personal and/or organizational values on the motivation and work-related behaviour 
of an individual [24][25], group formation [26], group norms and regulations [20], 
social influence and conformity [27], leadership [24], individual conflicts in 
organizations [28], and power and influence in groups [24]. The meso level considers 
structures and dynamics at the level of the whole organization and it includes 
aspects such as organization structure and behaviour [29][30][31], organization 
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authority and power structures [20][30][32], organization normative systems [20], 
intergroup conflict within an organization [28], organization reward system [23][33], 
technology in organizations [20][31] and organizational change [34]. The macro level 
focuses on the interactions between the organization and its environment and it 
includes aspects as inter-organizational formations (e.g. mergers, consolidations, 
joint ventures) [20] , governmental impact on organizations [31], organizations and 
politics [35], interactions between organizations and the society [20], organizations 
and markets [36] and virtual organizations [37].  
 
2.2 ORGANIZATIONAL MODELLING 
The first formal computational organization modelling approaches have been 
developed in the areas of the system dynamics theory [38] and operation research 
[39]. Organizational models specified in system dynamics (SD) are based on sets of 
coupled differential equations with exogenous variables, e.g. stock and flow 
diagrams that describe the dynamics of a labour market from a global perspective. 
Operation research proposes mathematical methods for identifying best possible 
solutions to problems related to coordination and execution of the operations within 
an organization [39], e.g. an optimization of a production line in an organization. 
 
Both system dynamics and operation research modelling approaches abstract from 
single events, entities and actors of organizations and take an aggregate view on the 
organizational dynamics. Such methods can be useful for the analysis of the 
organizational dynamics at macro levels, such as market fluctuations, or general 
trends of the organizational development. They do not support the investigation of 
the behaviour of organizational individuals and (the dynamics of) relations between 
them at detailed levels. As a high complexity of social dynamics may result from 
diverse local interactions among organizational actors, the examination of an 
organization at more detailed levels may help identifying causes of organizational 
malfunctioning and inefficiencies. 
 
Agent-based modelling approaches take into account such local perspectives of 
possibly large numbers of separate components and their specific behaviours and 
interactions in a system. The concept of an agent may be used to model both human 
beings as well as hardware and software components of socio-technical systems 
[40][41]. Most agent definitions agree that an agent is an entity that is able to 
perceive its environment and to act upon this environment. Multi-agent systems are 
frequently used in computational organization theory [42], which uses computational 
and mathematical techniques for the investigation of human organizations. Multi-
agent organizational models typically describe organizations at various aggregation 
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levels, such as the whole organization + its environment, group levels and individual 
levels. Various methodologies for modelling and design of multi-agent systems have 
been developed, including GAIA [43], AGR [44], SODA [45] , MOISE [46] and TROPOS 
[47]. Models used in computational organization theory often focus on a limited 
number of organizational aspects that are directly related to the considered research 
problem. For instance, organization-oriented models of multi-agent systems were 
used to support processes at organizations, such as structuring of organizational 
goals [48][49], modelling organizational interactions [50] and task coordination [51]. 
 
In an effort to provide a generic and broad-scope framework that enables analysis 
and prediction of organizational behaviour by considering concepts and their 
relations across different perspectives and at various aggregation levels, a multi-
view hybrid organizational modelling framework was developed [52]. This modelling 
framework considers the following four interrelated views to describe both 
institutional aspects of the formal organization, as well as the social behaviour of 
organizational actors (agents): 
• The organization-oriented view describes a functional decomposition of an 
organization by a composite structure of roles at various aggregation levels. 
These roles are abstracted from particular agents that may fulfil them, e.g. 
business unit, department, manager or operator. The organization-oriented view 
describes interactions between roles and specifies the authority relations in an 
organization: superior-subordinate relations on roles with respect to tasks, 
responsibility relations, authorization relations and control for resources; 
• The performance-oriented view describes the goals of the organizational roles in 
a goal structure of generic and specific goals. It uses performance indicators as 
measures of goal achievement for organizational roles; 
• The process-oriented view describes tasks and processes in the organization. It 
specifies static and dynamic relations between processes, e.g. decomposition, 
ordering and synchronization, and the resources used and produced;  
• The agent-oriented view describes the link between the role-based formal 
organizational model and the agents that are to perform the roles. It formulates 
agents’ types, their capabilities, their behaviour, and the principles of allocating 
agents to roles. On the one hand the performance and interactions of agents are 
regulated by the formal organization, on the other hand the dynamics and 
stochastic aspects of interacting agents contribute to performance variability in 
an organization. 
It follows from a comparison with a number of multi-agent modelling methods [18] 
that this multi-view hybrid organizational modelling framework considers the widest 
repertoire of relevant aspects for multi-agent modelling of organizations. 
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2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL MODELLING FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS 
For systematic reasoning about the risk of operations at the sharp end, there exists 
an extensive tradition of modelling the effects of errors and failures by techniques 
such as fault trees, event trees and Bayesian belief networks. Safety models of the 
blunt end are more seldom and below we discuss STAMP and SoTeRiA as interesting 
recent developments below. Given the focus on agent-based modelling in this 
research we also discuss the agent-based approach followed in TOPAZ accident risk 
modelling.  
 
2.3.1 STAMP 
Recognizing the limitations of traditional sequential accident models, Leveson 
developed the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) 
methodology [53], which uses system and control theory to describe socio-technical 
organizations. Here, an accident is not understood in terms of a series of events, but 
rather as the result of a lack of constraints imposed on the system design and on 
operations. STAMP uses system dynamics (SD) to describe interactions and dynamics 
between organizational processes and their effect on safety. The variables in such 
models typically are at an aggregated organizational level, rather than at the level of 
individuals in the organization. For example, in a model for safety culture at NASA, 
sub-models such as Launch Rate, System Safety Resource Allocation, Perceived 
Success by Management, and System Safety Status were used [54]. The dynamics are 
mostly continuous time-based with some triggering events; they are based on 
coupled ordinary differential equations with exogenous inputs, which may express 
event occurrences. STAMP models may describe relations between a large number of 
organizational variables, e.g. Perceived Concern for Performance, Perceived Concern 
for Safety, Level of Risk, and Fraction of Corrective Action to Fix Systemic Problems 
[54]. STAMP does not provide probability estimates of incidents or accidents. A 
STAMP model is evaluated via simulation runs showing dynamic traces of relevant 
variables. By varying model settings, the effects of conditions and decisions on 
dynamic traces for variables of interest can be evaluated.  
 
2.3.2 SOTERIA 
As a basis for the development of the Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA) 
framework [55] presented a wide list of principles of organizational risk analysis 
stemming from diverse disciplines, such as risk analysis, industrial/organizational 
psychology, organizational theory and human reliability. Mohaghegh et al. [56] 
propose a hybrid technique that uses three types of modelling techniques to specify 
a SoTeRiA model: (1) stock and flow diagrams from system dynamics (SD) to describe 
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the deterministic dynamics of interrelated organizational factors; (2) Bayesian Belief 
Networks to represent probabilistic relations between organizational factors; (3) 
Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) and Fault Trees (FTs) to describe relations between 
conditions, failures and errors in risk scenarios, leading to probability estimates of 
hazardous events. The application of this hybrid technique is illustrated [56] by an 
example of aircraft maintenance and the effects of its quality on aircraft 
airworthiness and accident risk. This application includes SD models such as 
management safety commitment, financial pressure, training management, hiring 
management, technicians’ commitment and technicians’ error probabilities. BBNs are 
used to represent internal auditing factors, regulatory auditing factors and aircraft 
airworthiness. FTs and ESDs are used to represent the effect of maintenance-induced 
engine failure on flight safety risk levels. The results of this example provided in [56] 
indicate related variations in management commitment, technician commitment, 
management financial distress, technician error probability and aircraft accident risk. 
All in all, the illustrated variations in the accident risk levels are very small (less than 
0.4%).    
 
2.3.3 TOPAZ 
Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ) is an air traffic risk 
assessment methodology, which uses agent-based Dynamic Risk Modelling (DRM) by 
Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets (DCPNs) and Monte Carlo simulation-based collision 
risk assessment as key techniques on which we focus our discussion here [57][58]. 
The development of TOPAZ models has been focused on the organization at the 
sharp end, i.e. pilots and controllers supported by technical systems in the context 
of specific traffic scenarios. The variables in these models are at the level of 
individual systems and operators, rather than at aggregated levels. The agents in the 
model represent systems or generic operators performing particular roles (e.g. 
runway controller, pilot flying). The dynamics are continuous time-based with 
internal stochastic triggering events, which are based on stochastic differential 
equations with jump processes. Monte Carlo simulations including speed-up 
techniques provide probability estimates of adverse safety events, typically in the 
order of about 1E-10 to 1E-7. Sensitivity analysis is used to assess the effect of 
operational aspects on the level of safety risk. These risk sensitivities are used to 
assess bias and uncertainty levels in the safety risk. Examples of applications include 
collision risk analyses of parallel en-route lanes [59], of active runway crossing 
operations [58] and of airborne separation assurance system-based (free flight) 
concepts [60]. 
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2.3.4 COMPARISON 
STAMP and SoTeRiA are similar in their application of SD organizational models. Such 
models abstract from single events, entities and actors of organizations and overall 
they take an aggregate view on the organizational dynamics. On the one hand, using 
such aggregate views may be simpler as it restricts the model complexity by 
focusing on presumed key aspects in the organization. On the other hand, it may be 
difficult to map actual organizational structures and processes to abstract 
aggregated model variables. By doing so, the link to the behaviour of organizational 
individuals and their interactions is lost, so that the level of analysis is reduced. 
Moreover, a high complexity of social dynamics of interacting organizational actors 
may result in unexpected emergent effects in the organization, which cannot be 
observed based on the aggregate view adhered to in SD models.  
  
In addition to STAMP, SoTeRiA provides a link to risk assessment via BNNs, ESDs and 
FTs. These techniques provide static mappings of risk levels, based on assumed 
probabilistic relations between events and conditions. Overall, risk levels in SoTeRiA 
may fluctuate as a result of the SD-based fluctuations in organizational variables. A 
drawback of the static risk mappings via BNNs, ESDs and FTs is that they may be 
limited to accurately describe the risk of complex socio-technical operations with 
concurrently interacting operators and systems [58][61][62]. 
 
Key differences of TOPAZ with STAMP and SoTeRiA are its scope, which has been 
restricted to operations rather than whole organizations, its use of agent-based 
models, which directly describe the performance of people and systems in the 
operation rather than aggregated variables, and its use of MC simulations and 
speed-up techniques to obtain low probabilities of adverse events.  
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3 DEVELOPMENT OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
MODEL 
3.1 CHOICE OF THE MODELLING FRAMEWORK 
Following the literature review (Section 2, [18]) we selected a modelling framework 
that fits our research aims. As put forth in the review, the recently developed safety-
focused organizational modelling methods STAMP and SoTeRiA heavily rely on 
system dynamics (SD) models, which tend to abstract from single events, entities and 
actors and to take an aggregate view on the organizational dynamics. Since safety 
culture is about shared beliefs, values and norms, and as such can be seen as a 
concept at an aggregated level, its representation and the analysis of its relation with 
organizational processes by SD models seems to be a feasible approach. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the basis of organizational and safety culture is formed 
by the beliefs, values and norms of individuals in the organization. It is their beliefs, 
values and norms that may be influenced by organizational processes, goals, 
policies, management and interactions, taking into account generic psychological 
and sociological characteristics and the specific context and experiences of the 
individuals. In other words, the integration of material and immaterial characteristics 
of an organization is grounded at the level of its individuals. As argued in the review, 
taking aggregated views at the start of the analysis may lead to neglecting 
organizational (e.g. safety culture) issues due to the complexity of interacting 
individuals in the organizational context. Agent-based organizational modelling uses 
the individual as starting point for its modelling and therefore well supports our 
analysis aims.   
 
In addition to the aim to integrate material and immaterial characteristics in the 
analysis of safety culture, the organizational modelling should set a basis for the 
analysis of the relations of safety culture and accident risk. In the review we showed 
that agent-based dynamic risk modelling (DRM), such as used in TOPAZ, is able to 
describe the variability in the dynamic performance of operators, systems and 
environmental conditions of complex safety-relevant scenarios, and that Monte Carlo 
simulations reveal the risk effects emerging from these variably performing and 
interacting agents. As future coupling of the organizational modelling and DRM is 
supported by using common modelling structures, this provides a second argument 
for using agent-based organizational modelling.    
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Based on above reasoning we set forth to use an agent-based organizational 
modelling framework in this research. It was found in the review that the multi-view 
hybrid organizational modelling framework of [52] is a generic and broad-scope 
framework that enables analysis and prediction of organizational behaviour by 
considering concepts and their relations across different perspectives and at various 
aggregation levels. As it was found to consider the widest repertoire of relevant 
aspects for multi-agent organizational modelling, this modelling framework was 
selected for this study.  
 
3.2 THE MODELLING CASE AND RELATED SAFETY CULTURE ISSUES 
The modelling case focused on in this paper is safety culture in relation to safety 
occurrence reporting at a particular West-European air navigation service provider 
(ANSP-3). Various sources of information were used as a basis for the model 
development in this case: 
• Parts of the documentation of the safety management system (SMS) at ANSP-3 
gave information on the formal arrangements of safety occurrence assessment 
and safety monitoring at the ANSP; 
• Interviews with an incident investigator and a safety manager at ANSP-3 provided 
insight in the implementation of the safety occurrence assessment procedures 
and related informal aspects; 
• An interview with a safety occurrence assessment expert at EUROCONTROL Head 
Quarters provided information about general safety occurrence processing 
procedures and related informal aspects, regulations and consequences; 
• EUROCONTROL safety culture survey results of two other ANSPs (ANSP-1, ANSP-
2) provided us insight in the ranges of the survey results and the safety culture 
issues at those ANSPs; 
• General literature provided insight in safety culture issues at ANSPs [2][5][63] as 
well as general psychological and sociological aspects relevant for the agent-
based model (e.g. [19][64]). 
Next, we highlight identified aspects of safety occurrence reporting at ANSPs as well 
as related safety culture issues. 
 
In Europe, regulations [65][66] require ANSPs to report safety occurrences and they 
describe a large variety of occurrences that must be reported. Examples of safety 
occurrences are separation minima infringement, runway incursion, aircraft deviation 
from air traffic control (ATC) clearance or inability to provide air traffic management 
(ATM) services. Air traffic controllers typically work in teams under the supervision of 
a supervisor. When having observed a safety occurrence, a controller should describe 
it in a report. The draft report is reviewed and maybe corrected by the supervisor and 
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it is provided to the Safety Investigation Unit of the ANSP. The ANSP reports safety 
occurrences to the National Supervisory Authority (NSA) and the NSAs report to 
EUROCONTROL at a European scale. The Safety Investigation Unit of an ANSP 
analyses the reported occurrence, possibly supported by automatically logged 
information, and tries to find contributory factors. At ANSP-3, individual occurrences 
and possible trends are discussed monthly by an experts group (incident 
investigator, safety manager, controllers, procedural, system and human factor 
experts). The resulting recommendations are published in a company-wide 
accessible database. Conclusions on individual occurrences may be told by the 
incident investigator to the controller(s) concerned. We were informed that at some 
European ANSPs there exists a punitive culture, where controllers may receive verbal 
and/or financial punishment when they are involved in an occurrence; this is not the 
case at ANSP-3. In general a consequence of a more severe occurrence may be that 
during its analysis, the licence of the involved controller(s) is temporarily retracted. If 
it follows from the analysis that the controller made an important mistake, the 
controller(s) may be assigned a dedicated training to regain the licence. Externally 
invoked consequences of (typically severe) safety occurrences may be prosecution by 
a Public Prosecution Department or media attention; their impact on the well-being 
of the people involved may be high. 
 
The safety culture issues identified in the references indicated can be categorized 
along the following four aggregation levels: 
1. The level of an individual (e.g. a controller, a supervisor, a manager);  
2. The level of a team (e.g. a team of air traffic controllers); 
3. The level of intra-organizational structures (e.g. a department);  
4. The level of inter-organizational interaction (i.e. influences from other 
organizations).  
Examples of safety culture issues for these four aggregation levels are shown in 
Table 1.  
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Table 1: Examples of identified safety culture issues; a full list is in [67]. 
Group 1: Individual aspects 
Occurrence reporting may lead to ‘naming and blaming’ and therefore it may not be in 
the personal interest of an actor. 
The confidentiality of reporting is not trusted. 
Actors find it difficult to keep up with numerous changes in procedures/the system. 
Group 2: Team aspects 
Willingness of actors to cooperate may decrease when the other actor has been 
involved in an incident. 
Problems are not raised as actors do not want to be seen as trouble-makers. 
Group 3: Intra-organizational aspects 
Importance of safety-related goals may be threatened by performance-related goals. 
Formal procedures do not always sufficiently describe the required work processes and 
sometimes need to be worked around. 
It takes too long to create an occurrence report. 
Minor safety occurrences are not defined precisely. 
Feedback / lessons learned from incidents come too late or not at all. 
Controllers do not receive acknowledgement for reporting. 
The organisation does not use feedback from occurrences to improve the way of 
working / technical systems. 
Insufficient number of safety experts and support staff for tasks such as processing of 
occurrence reports. 
Group 4: Inter-organizational aspects 
Information about occurrences in other ANSPs is not provided by the ANS. 
Regulator may put too many irrelevant requirements and norms on ANSPs that are hard 
to fulfil and that decrease the freedom of ANSPs significantly. 
The Public Prosecution Department may decide to investigate occurrences and decide 
to prosecute involved organizations or humans; here occurrence reports may be used. 
 
Based on the safety occurrence processes and related safety culture issues, we 
identified groups of aspects that are relevant for safety occurrence reporting at the 
four aggregation levels. Figure 1 shows a high-level categorization of these aspects, 
which may refer to more detailed levels, e.g. the category ‘Individual safety-related 
beliefs and attitudes’ includes sub-categories such as ‘Trust in the confidentiality of 
reporting’, ‘ Trust in the effectiveness of reporting’ and ‘Perception of the 
commitment to safety of management’. We identified potential modelling methods 
and data for these aspects and we decided on the key aspects to be included in the 
organizational model [67]. As a part of this choice, we decided to restrict the scope 
of the model to aggregation levels 1, 2 and 3 of an ANSP; thus leaving out inter-
organizational aspects such as interactions with airlines and NSA at this stage. 
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Figure 1: Identified groups of aspects that influence safety occurrence reporting 
 
3.3 MODELLING OF THE FORMAL ORGANIZATION 
The multi-view hybrid organizational modelling framework considers four 
interrelated views to describe the institutional aspects of the formal organization as 
well as the social behaviour of the organizational actors. Sorted predicate logic 
restricted to finite sorts has been chosen as a formal basis for the definition of 
dedicated modelling languages for each of these views [52]. Temporal relations in 
the specifications of the views are specified by the Temporal Trace Language (TTL), 
which is a variant of reified order-sorted temporal predicate logic. In TTL the 
organizational dynamics are represented by a trace, i.e. a temporally ordered 
sequence of states. Each state is characterized by a unique time point and a set of 
state properties that hold (i.e., are true). The state properties are specified using the 
dedicated language(s) of the view(s). The temporal properties are defined in TTL as 
transition relations between the state properties. For example, the property that for 
all time points if an agent ag believes that action a is rewarded with r, then ag will 
after 30 time units perform a, is formalized in TTL as: 
 ∀t:TIME [ at(internal(ag, belief(reward_for_action(r, a))), t) →  
 at(output(ag, performed_action(a)), t+30) ] 
Both specifications in the dedicated languages of the views and in TTL are suitable 
for performing computations. In particular, in [68] it is shown that any TTL formula 
can be automatically translated into executable format that can be implemented in 
most commonly used programming languages. 
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Below a concise high-level description of the three views specifying the formal 
organization is provided: organization-oriented view, performance-oriented view 
and process-oriented view. For more details on the formal specification we refer to 
the companion paper [17] or to the related reports [69][70]. 
 
The organization-oriented view describes a functional decomposition of an 
organization by a composite structure of the roles at various aggregation levels. 
These roles are abstracted from particular agents that may fulfil them. In the case 
study, the ANSP is at the highest aggregation level, it includes at a second 
aggregation level composite roles such as maintenance unit, safety investigation 
unit, safety monitoring unit and air traffic control unit, and it has at a third 
aggregation level roles such as safety investigator, safety manager, air traffic 
controller and supervisor. As an example, Figure 2 shows the interactions between 
the roles in an ANSP at the second aggregation level. For each role, requirements on 
the level of knowledge, skills and personal traits are defined. The organization-
oriented view also describes interactions between roles and specifies the authority 
relations in an organization: superior-subordinate relations on roles with respect to 
tasks, responsibility relations, authorization relations and control for resources.   
 
 
Figure 2: Example of interactions between roles in an ANSP 
 
The performance-oriented view describes the goals that are aimed for by the roles in 
the organization and it uses performance indicators to reflect the state or progress 
of a role with respect to a goal. The definition of goals includes their level of priority, 
time horizon, ownership, perspective, hardness and negotiability. Goals can be 
refined into more specific goals and thus form goal structures. For instance, a goal 
to maintain high quality of incident investigation may be made more specific by sub-
goals requiring a high proficiency level for incident investigators, detailed incident 
notification reports and timely investigation of incidents.  
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The process-oriented view describes the formal tasks, their relations and the 
resources used and produced in an organization. In the modelling framework, tasks 
may range from generic to specific and this is specified by a task decomposition. For 
each task, minimum and maximum timelines are indicated and it is specified what 
resources a task uses and produces. Workflows are defined that describe sequences 
of tasks in particular scenarios. In relation with the performance-oriented view it is 
specified to what goals a task contributes. In relation with the organization-oriented 
view it is specified which roles are authorized and/or responsible for the task.     
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Figure 3: Workflow example: occurrence reporting 
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Safety occurrence reporting is a key process in the organizational model and the 
workflow for its tasks is shown in Figure 3 as an example. The workflow describes 
the actions for the reporting of occurrences and the processing of reported 
occurrences, starting with deciding by a controller to report an occurrence, up to 
assessment of occurrences and implementation of policies to prevent similar 
occurrences. In relation with the organization-oriented view, the responsibilities of 
the roles for the tasks in the workflow are defined, e.g., the controller is responsible 
for execution of and decision making with respect to the task ‘Create a notification 
report’, the supervisor is responsible for monitoring and consulting for this task. 
Note that the responsibilities of roles are not indicated in the graphical 
representation of the workflow, but rather defined as a part of the formal 
specification. 
 
3.4 MODELLING OF THE AGENTS IN THE ORGANIZATION 
An agent is an entity that is able to perceive and act upon its environment. The 
behaviour of an agent can be considered from external and internal perspectives. 
From the external perspective, the behaviour can be specified by dynamic relations 
between agent’s input and output states, according to the interaction with other 
agents and with the environment in a multi-agent organization. In order to illustrate 
a multi-agent organization in our case study, Figure 4 shows interactions between 
selected agents in safety occurrence reporting. Consider that controller agent 1 
observes a separation minimum infringement in the environment, discusses it with 
controller agents 2 and 3, and decides to report it. Controller agent 1 provides a 
draft report to supervisor agent 1 and next the report is provided to the incident 
investigator agent. After a particular time, the incident investigator may provide 
feedback on the particular incident to supervisor agent 1, and the safety manager 
agent may provide generic feedback to supervisor agents 1 and 2. The supervisor 
agents communicate about this specific and generic feedback to the controller 
agents in their teams and thereby influence their behaviour. Note that the 
interactions and performance of the agents in this example reflect their roles and 
tasks as described in the formal organizational modelling views. In addition, the 
agent-oriented view describes the informal interactions and agents’ behaviour, 
based on the agents’ internal perspectives.   
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Controller
Agent 1
Controller
Agent 6
Supervisor
Agent 1
Supervisor
Agent 2
Controller
Agent 5
Controller
Agent 4
Controller
Agent 3
Controller
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Incident 
Investigator 
Agent
Safety Officer
Agent
Incident
 
Figure 4: Example of interactions between selected agents in a multi-agent organization 
 
From the internal perspective the behaviour of an agent is characterized by causal 
relations between internal states of the agent, based on which externally observable 
behavioural patterns are generated (Figure 5). An agent perceives information by 
observation or communication and generates output in the form of communication 
or actions. The internal states of an agent include information attitudes (e.g. belief, 
knowledge) and pro-attitudes (e.g. desire, intention, obligation, commitment) [71]. 
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Agents are considered as goal-driven, where pro-attitudes are based on needs. The 
externally observable behaviour based on the internal states is determined by the 
decision making process. The way in which these aspects of agent are represented in 
this study is discussed next. 
 
Communication
Observation
Communication
Action
beliefs
knowledge
Information 
attitudes
desires
commitments
intentions
Pro-
attitudes
Characteristics
needs
decision
making
skillspersonality 
 
Figure 5: Internal perspective of an agent 
 
3.4.1 AGENT’S INFORMATION ATTITUDES AND PRO-ATTITUDES 
Agents create dynamic internal representations about their input and output states, 
such as observed events, messages of other agents and occurrence reports. These 
may consider single states as well as more complex beliefs about dependencies 
between its own states and observed states of the environment and other agents. 
Temporal relations between state properties are represented by TTL. In the 
developed model, relations between agent’s internal states are often represented by 
causal networks [72], which describe weighted mappings between ‘evidence 
variables’ with values in the range from 0 to 1. As an example,  
Figure 6 shows the causal network for the commitment to safety of a controller. It 
represents that a controller agent’s commitment to safety is influenced by the 
perceived commitment to safety of team members and the management, by the 
priority of safety-related goals in the role description, by the influence of the 
controller on safety activities and by the maturity level of the controller [64][73]. The 
rounded boxes in  
Figure 6 refer to evidence variables that are considered as input of the organizational 
model and the rectangular boxes refer to evidence variables that depend on other 
evidence variables in the model. For instance, an agent evaluates the management’s 
commitment to safety by considering factors that reflect the management’s effort in 
contributing to safety, such as investment in personnel and technical systems, 
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training and safety arrangements. As another example, the maturity level of a 
controller depends on aspects as the self-confidence, the commitment to perform 
the ATC task, the level of skill and training of the agent and the quality of feedback 
on occurrence reporting received by the agent. By interconnection of causal networks 
complex dynamic relationships can be represented, including feedback loops.  
 
 
Figure 6: Causal network for ‘Commitment to safety of a controller’ 
 
3.4.2 AGENT’S NEEDS 
The behaviour of individuals is considered to be goal-driven, where the individual 
goals are based on needs. Three types of needs are distinguished: (1) extrinsic needs 
associated with biological comfort and material rewards; (2) social interaction needs 
that refer to the desire for social approval and affiliation, e.g. own group approval 
and management approval; (3) intrinsic needs that concern the desires for self-
development and self-actualization, e.g. contribution to safety-related goals, self-
esteem and self-confidence [74]. Different needs have different priorities and 
minimal acceptable satisfaction levels for individuals in different cultures. In this 
study we use three indices of the cultural classification framework of Hofstede [75]: 
the individualism index reflects the degree to which individuals are not integrated 
into groups; the power distance index is the extent to which the less powerful 
members of an organization accept and expect that power is distributed unequally; 
and the uncertainty avoidance index deals with individual’s tolerance for uncertainty 
and ambiguity. The model uses values for these indices that are suitable for the 
Western European culture [75]. The model has internal states that represent to what 
extent the agent’s needs are satisfied as result of external events, the behaviour of 
other agents and decisions made. The level of satisfaction of agent’s needs 
influences the decision making process, as will be explained next. 
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3.4.3 AGENT’S DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
The decision making model of agents is based on the expectancy theory by Vroom 
[23][74], which is illustrated in Figure 7. According to Vroom’s theory, when a human 
evaluates alternative possibilities to act, the following factors are explicitly or 
implicitly taken into account:  
• Expectancy: the individual’s belief about the likelihood that a particular act will 
be followed by a particular first-level outcome. For example in Figure 7, the 
expectancy E12 refers to the belief of the likelihood that reporting of an 
occurrence results in a reprimand;  
• Instrumentality: the belief concerning the likelihood that a first-level outcome 
results into a second-level outcome, which may be liked or disliked as reflected 
by the agent’s needs. For example in Figure 7, the instrumentality I32 refers to 
the belief about the likelihood that own group appreciation of the action results 
in own group approval; 
• Valence: the strength of the individual’s desire for an outcome or state of affairs. 
The values of valances depend on the degree of satisfaction of the agent’s need: 
the more a need is satisfied, the less is its valence. An example in Figure 7 is the 
need and valence V2 for own group approval as part of social interaction needs. 
 
Report an
occurrence Own group approval
Contribution to
organizational safety-
related goals
Self-esteem, self-
confidence, and self-
actualization needs
Administrative reprimand
Improvement of safety
Material reward Extrinsic needs
E12
E13
E14
E15
I21
I32
V1
V2
V5
V4
Social interaction needs
Own group appreciation of
the action
Management approval V3
Management appreciation of
the action
E16
I43
I51
Intrinsic needs
I64
I65
I35
I45
Decrease of own professional
status in own group
Decrease of own professional
status in management’s
opinion
E17
I72
I75
E18
I83
I85
First level outcome Second level outcome
 
Figure 7: Decision making model for reporting an occurrence (E’s are expectancies, I’s are 
instrumentalities and V’s are valences) 
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In the model for the safety occurrence reporting, a controller agent considers the 
possibilities to report or not to report, depending on their expectancies, 
instrumentalities and valences. These are dynamic variables that change over time 
due to individual and organizational learning. In particular, in the model their values 
depend on the occurrence of safety-relevant events and on related evidence 
variables. For example, agent’s expectancies E12 and E15 change depending on the 
reprimands and rewards for occurrences reported by the agent or another agent in 
its shift. As another example, the expectancy E16 that reporting improves safety is 
adjusted based on the feedback from the safety investigator agent on previously 
reported occurrences, on the observed implementation of safety recommendations 
for previous reports, as well as on the safety information provided informally by 
other controllers during breaks.   
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4 SAFETY CULTURE RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The developed model was used to predict and analyse the safety culture performance 
of ANSP-3 and the model results were compared with the results of a EUROCONTROL 
safety culture survey study of this ANSP. This was done in the following three phases:  
• Phase 1: Comparison of model-based and survey-based safety culture indicators, 
where the input values of the model were completely based on organizational 
information available prior to the survey questionnaire results; 
• Phase 2: Comparison of model-based and survey-based safety culture indicators, 
where the input values of the model used organizational information in 
combination with survey questionnaire results; 
• Phase 3: Comparison of major organizational factors affecting the safety culture 
indicators and related organizational improvement options, which were inferred 
from a sensitivity analysis of the organizational model, with key issues and 
recommendations stemming from the safety culture survey workshop results. 
Next, Section 4.2 highlights the safety culture survey study and Sections 4.3 to 4.5 
present the details of the three phases. 
 
4.2 SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY STUDY 
As a prelude to systemic changes in air traffic management (ATM), EUROCONTROL 
developed a safety culture survey approach for ANSPs, which includes questionnaires 
and subsequent workshops as main steps [6]. The safety culture questionnaires 
provide people in the organization the opportunity to reflect anonymously on a 
range of statements about the attitudes and the way the work is done. The questions 
address the following topics: commitment, responsibility & risk awareness, 
involvement, teamwork, learning & reporting and communications & trust. In the 
workshops the key items found by the questionnaires are discussed to interpret and 
analyse their background and to find ways to improve them. This safety culture 
survey approach has now been applied at a large number of ANSPs in Europe. 
 
The questionnaire distributed at ANSP-3 contained 32 statements in a general 
section common to all respondents, 18 statements directed to operational experts as 
controllers, supervisors and trainers, 19 statements directed to engineers, 
technicians and maintainers, and 23 statements directed to the management staff. 
For each statement the respondents were asked to select a response on a five-point 
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scale: ‘1: strongly disagree’, ‘2: disagree’, ‘3: neither’, ‘4: agree’ and ‘5: strongly 
agree’. The questionnaire was completed by 222 people of ANSP-3’s personnel; 
about half of the questionnaires were from air traffic controllers. Descriptive 
statistics were derived for the responses, including mean and standard deviation of 
the scores as well as percentages of favourable and unfavourable responses with 
respect to safety. Examples of the questions and mean scores are provided in Table 
3 (Section 4.3) and Table 5 (Section 4.4); the complete questionnaire results are 
confidential. Following a preliminary analysis of the data, six workshop sessions 
were organized to interpret and analyse their key findings: one session with 
managers, one session with human resources and security, and four sessions with 
operational and engineering staff. The latter four sessions focussed on specific 
topics. Based on the questionnaire data and subsequent workshops, conclusions 
were reached on the safety culture status for the various topics and their 
contributing organizational factors, and recommendations were made for further 
improvement of the safety culture. Examples of organizational factors identified in 
the workshops are listed in Table 8 (Section 4.5).        
 
4.3 PHASE 1 
In Phase 1 we compared safety culture indicators stemming from the model with 
indicators from the questionnaires. Based on the identification of safety culture 
issues as discussed in Section 3.2, we selected eight model variables as relevant 
safety culture indicators (see list in Table 2). Per definition these model-based safety 
culture indicators have values in the range from 0 to 1, but their distributions over 
this interval are not a priori known. To analyse these distributions we performed 
Monte Carlo simulations in which all evidence input variables (see list in Table 7) 
were varied over their full range, except for the national culture variables (e61 – 
e64), which were associated with Western European culture. Figure 8 provides 
examples of histograms for the Monte Carlo simulations results for two safety 
culture indicators. In the Monte Carlo simulation results mostly three areas in the 
sample populations of the safety culture indicators could be identified: a range of 
infrequently occurring low values, a range of frequently occurring medium values 
and a range of infrequently occurring high values. Based on this observed 
trichotomy, we defined the classes Low/Medium/High for the values of the safety 
culture indicators. We associated the first 30% of these values with the class Low, the 
next 55% with the class Medium and the last 15% with the class High. The resulting 
ranges of the class definitions for the model-based safety culture indicators are 
shown in Table 2. 
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Figure 8: Examples of distributions of safety culture indicators (Monte Carlo simulation 
results): I1.1 Average reporting quality of controllers (left figure) and I5.1 Average 
commitment to safety of controllers (right figure).   
 
Table 2: Distribution of model-based safety culture indicators over three classes as obtained 
by Monte Carlo simulations. N.B. (a,b] signifies all values x with  a < x ≤ b.   
Low Medium High 
Safety culture indicator 
0 – 30% 30 – 85% 85 – 100% 
I1.1 Average reporting quality of controllers [0, 0.55] (0.55, 0.76] (0.76, 1] 
I2.1 
Average quality of the processed 
notification reports  
[0, 0.27] (0.27, 0.45] (0.45, 1] 
I3.1 
Average quality of the final safety 
occurrence assessment reports 
[0, 0.14] (0.14, 0.32] (0.32, 1] 
I4.1 
Average quality of the monthly safety 
overview reports received by controllers 
[0, 0.44] (0.44, 0.66] (0.66, 1] 
I5.1 
Average commitment to safety of 
controllers 
[0, 0.43] (0.43, 0.63] (0.63, 1] 
I5.2 
Average commitment to safety of a team as 
perceived by controllers 
[0, 0.43] (0.43, 0.63] (0.63, 1] 
I6 
Average commitment to safety of a 
supervisor as perceived by controllers 
[0, 0.48] (0.48, 0.7] (0.7, 1] 
I7 
Average commitment to safety of 
management as perceived by controllers 
[0, 0.45] (0.45, 0.63] (0.63, 1] 
 
As a basis for the derivation of survey-based safety culture indicator results, we 
defined relations between the indicators and related questions of the survey 
questionnaire (see Table 3). This was done before we received the outcomes of the 
questionnaire. For the cases where an indicator is related to multiple questions, a 
weight was assigned to each question, indicating our estimate of the degree of 
relevance of the question for the safety culture indicator. Next, we associated the 
weighted average of the survey-based safety culture indicator with the three classes 
Low/Medium/High. This association was based on the distribution of the means of 
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the survey questions of a particular ANSP-2 (different from ANSP-3) and the above 
defined class distributions (Low 30%, Medium 55%, High 15%). This resulted in the 
following class ranges for the questionnaire results: 
• Values in the range ≥1 and ≤3.25 are defined as Low; 
• Values in the range >3.25 and ≤4.0 are defined as Medium;   
• Values in the range >4.0 and ≤5.0 are defined as High.  
After above preparatory steps we received the questionnaire results of ANSP-3 and 
we derived the resulting classes of the survey-based safety culture indicators as 
shown in Table 3. It can be observed that six indicators are Medium, indicator I6 is 
Low and indicator I2.1 could not be derived from the questionnaire data. 
 
Table 3: Safety culture indicators based on survey questionnaire results 
Safety culture indicator 
No. Description 
Related safety culture survey 
questions 
Weight 
Survey 
result 
Total 
A.24 People understand the 
need to report incidents in 
order to identify trends and 
make changes to the system if 
required 
0.5 
3.7 
Medium 
A.31. If I see an unsafe practice 
by a colleague I am able to 
report it in a way that we all 
learn lessons from it. 
0.3 
3.3 
Medium 
I1.1 
Reporting quality (ratio 
reported/observed) in the 
whole organization. 
A.32. If I do something unsafe I 
am aware that I may be asked 
to explain myself 
0.2 
4.1 
High 
3.7 
Medium 
I2.1 
Average quality of the 
processed notification 
reports produced by a 
controller in the whole 
organization.  
No related question identified. - - - 
I3.1 
Average quality of the 
received final safety 
occurrence assessment 
reports by controllers in 
the whole organization.  
A.22 Appropriate responses are 
made after an incident to 
address why the incident 
occurred. 
1 
3.7 
Medium 
3.7  
Medium 
A.24 People understand the 
need to report incidents in 
order to identify trends and 
make changes to the system if 
required 
0.4 
3.7 
Medium 
I4.1  
Average quality of the 
monthly safety overview 
reports received by 
controllers in the whole 
organization.  
A.29 Lessons learned from 
incidents are published in a de-
identified manner in a 
newsletter or similar document 
0.6 
3.3 
Medium 
3.5 
Medium 
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Safety culture indicator 
No. Description 
Related safety culture survey 
questions 
Weight 
Survey 
result 
Total 
I5.1  
Commitment to safety of a 
controller 
B.10 Controllers would never 
compromise their responsibility 
to safety. 
1 
3.8 
Medium 
3.8 
Medium 
A.4 My colleagues are 
committed to safety.  
0.7 
4.0 
Medium 
I5.2 
Perceived commitment to 
safety of a team of 
controllers 
 
A.11 Everyone at my Unit/Team 
feels that safety is their 
personal responsibility.  
0.3 
3.8 
Medium 
3.9 
Medium 
I6 
Perceived commitment to 
safety of supervisor. 
B.16 My concern about safety 
would be acted on if I 
expressed them to my 
supervisor 
1 
3.0 
Low 
3.0 
Low 
I7 
Perceived commitment to 
safety of management. 
A.7 My management is 
committed to safety 
1 
3.4 
Medium 
3.4 
Medium 
 
In Phase 1, the safety culture indicators were predicted by the agent-based 
organizational model on the basis of evidence input values, which had been derived 
using organizational information of ANSP-3 consisting of interviews, SMS documents 
and general literature, as indicated in Section 3.2. The resulting values and classes of 
the safety culture indicators are listed in Table 4 and they can be compared with the 
survey-based indicators. It follows from Table 4 that according to the model all 
safety culture indicators except I3.1 are High. The Medium value of I3.1 indicates 
sub-optimal feedback provision on safety occurrences to air traffic controllers 
and/or insufficient amount of details in the safety occurrence assessment reports. 
The values of indicators I1.1 and I4.1 are High but close to the border of the class 
Medium, the other High indicators are well away from this border. Comparing the 
survey and model results, it is clear that the model results are consistently higher 
than the survey results, except for indicator I3.1.   
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Table 4: Comparison of the safety culture indicators obtained by the organizational model and 
the survey questionnaire data in Phase 1 
Model 
Index Safety culture indicator 
Value Class 
Survey 
I1.1 Average reporting quality of controllers 0.80 High Medium 
I2.1 Average quality of the processed notification reports  0.65 High - 
I3.1 
Average quality of the final safety occurrence 
assessment reports 
0.23 Medium Medium 
I4.1 
Average quality of the monthly safety overview reports 
received by controllers 
0.70 High Medium 
I5.1 Average commitment to safety of controllers 0.72 High Medium 
I5.2 
Average commitment to safety of a team as perceived 
by controllers 
0.70 High Medium 
I6 
Average commitment to safety of a supervisor as 
perceived by controllers 
0.78 High Low 
I7 
Average commitment to safety of management as 
perceived by controllers 
0.76 High Medium 
 
4.4 PHASE 2 
In Phase 2, the safety culture indicators were predicted by the agent-based 
organizational model on the basis of organizational information of ANSP-3 in 
combination with survey questionnaire results. The applied survey questionnaire 
results had not already been used for the determination of the values of the safety 
culture indicators. For each input evidence variable we pursued to identify related 
survey questions: 
• For 14 evidence input variables we identified one to six related survey questions; 
• For five evidence input variables we did not identify any related survey question. 
 For the cases where we identified related survey questions, we averaged the scores 
and combined them with a priori knowledge on the organization in an updated value 
for the input evidence variable. Table 5 shows some examples of input evidence 
variables, related survey questions and updated values of the variable. For most of 
the evidence input variables this process led to a decrease in their values. 
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Table 5: Examples of the update of evidence input variables, based on survey questionnaire 
results (full list in [70]) 
Ev. 
variable Ev. Description 
Related safety culture survey 
questions 
Survey 
result 
Old New 
A.1. Balancing safety against the other 
requirements of my job is a challenge 
3.5 
A.5. Safety is a responsibility shared 
throughout the organization 
3.7 
e1 
Priority of safety-
related goals in the 
role description A.12. The other people in the 
organization do not understand the 
safety roles we fulfil 
3.0 
0.90 0.70 
B.2 Our opinion and input into safety 
assessments are actively sought after. 
2.8 
B.12 We are consulted about changes 
to the technical/engineering system 
that impact on the way we do our 
work 
3.2 
e4 
Influence of a 
controller on safety 
activities 
B.15 I have the opportunity to provide 
input in the ATC systems development 
or acquisition process. 
2.9 
0.70 0.50 
e9 
Availability of reliable 
and ergonomic 
technical systems for 
controllers 
B.8 I trust the ATC equipment that I 
use in my job. 
3.9 0.90 0.75 
A.28. Information about changes to 
procedures or the system is easily 
accessible 
3.4 
A.26 There are so many changes that 
it is hard to keep track of the current 
situation 
2.8 e10 
Sufficiency and 
timeliness of training 
for changes 
A.30. I am kept informed of changes 
that have been made to procedures or 
systems 
3.7 
0.80 0.60 
 
Based on the updated values of the input evidence variables, new model simulation 
results were obtained. Table 6 shows the updated model results in relation with the 
(unchanged) survey-based results. All safety culture indicators are now in the class 
Medium, except for indicator I2.1. Indicators I1.1 and I7 are close to the class 
boundary with High, all other indicators are well off from a class boundary. It follows 
from a comparison of the original model results in Table 4 and the updated model 
results in Table 6 that all indicators transferred to a lower class, except for indicators 
I2.1 and I3.1. Comparison of the model and survey results in Table 6 shows that the 
results are consistent for six out of seven indicators; only the result for indicator I6 is 
lower in the survey than in the model. As a result of the input updating, the 
consistency between the model and the survey-based results for the safety culture 
indicators has thus increased considerably.   
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Table 6: Comparison of the safety culture indicator classes for the survey data and for the 
organizational model with updated model input values (Phase 2) 
Model 
Index Safety culture indicator 
Value Class 
Survey 
I1.1 Average reporting quality of controllers 0.74 Medium Medium 
I2.1 Average quality of the processed notification reports  0.54 High - 
I3.1 
Average quality of the final safety occurrence 
assessment reports 
0.20 Medium Medium 
I4.1 
Average quality of the monthly safety overview reports 
received by controllers 
0.58 Medium Medium 
I5.1 Average commitment to safety of controllers 0.56 Medium Medium 
I5.2 
Average commitment to safety of a team as perceived 
by controllers 
0.55 Medium Medium 
I6 
Average commitment to safety of a supervisor as 
perceived by controllers 
0.60 Medium Low 
I7 
Average commitment to safety of management as 
perceived by controllers 
0.61 Medium Medium 
 
4.5 PHASE 3 
In Phase 3 we employed a sensitivity analysis to predict organizational factors at 
ANSP-3 that are important for its safety culture indicators and on the basis of these 
factors we proposed a number of organizational improvement options as ways to 
improve the safety culture. Next we compared these results with issues and 
recommendations that were identified earlier in workshops of the EUROCONTROL 
safety culture survey at ANSP-3. In coordination with the EUROCONTROL experts 
who performed the safety culture survey we reached conclusions about the level of 
agreement between the model- and the survey-based results. 
 
4.5.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The sensitivity analysis method used in this study is Monte Carlo filtering [76]. It 
aims to identify the model parameters of which the variation according to associated 
credibility intervals leads to significant differences in attained model output classes. 
It was applied in the following way.  
 
For the complete set of model parameters, lower and upper bounds of credibility 
intervals of their values were determined. These bounds are based on the variability 
in and the level of applicability of related safety culture questionnaire results and on 
our understanding of the level of uncertainty of the modelled aspects. Next, Monte 
Carlo simulations were performed, where in each simulation the parameters were 
chosen uniformly within their credibility interval bounds. The number of performed 
Monte Carlo simulations was sufficient to obtain stable results (8000 simulations of 
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three years periods each appeared sufficient). For each parameter ix  two sets of 
values were determined:  
• |ix B , containing all values of ix  that produced a High safety culture indicator, 
and  
• |ix B , containing all values of ix  that produced a Low or Medium safety culture 
indicator. 
A Smirnov two sample test was performed for each input factor independently. The 
applied test statistic is 
 ( ) sup ( | ) ( | )i Y B i B id x F x B F x B= −  
where BF  and BF  are marginal cumulative probability distribution functions 
calculated for the sets |ix B and |ix B , respectively, andY is the output. A low level 
of ( )id x  supports the null-hypothesis 0 : ( | ) ( | )B i B iH F x B F x B= , meaning that the 
parameter ix   is not important, whereas a high level of ( )id x  implies the rejection of 
0H  meaning that ix  is a key factor. It was determined at what significance level α, 
the value of ( )id x  implies the rejection of 0H , where α is the probability of rejecting 
0H  when it is true. To obtain a convenient overview over the sensitivity analysis 
results, we use a tripartite classification:   
• If α ≤ 0.01, then the sensitivity for ix is High;  
• If 0.01 < α  ≤ 0.1, then the sensitivity for ix is Medium;   
• If α > 0.1, then the sensitivity for ix is Low. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis for all input evidence variables 
for each safety culture indicator, according to above methodology. We calculated a 
total safety culture sensitivity index by firstly setting a value 0 for Low sensitivity, a 
value 0.5 for Medium sensitivity and a value 1 for High sensitivity, and subsequently 
summing those values over all safety culture indicators for a particular parameter. 
There are eight evidence input variables with a total safety culture sensitivity index 
of at least four (which will be discussed in Section 4.5.2). For all other types of 
parameters in the model, the same sensitivity analysis was performed. Overall, the 
importance of the other parameters for the total set of safety culture indicators is 
more modest than the importance of the input evidence variables. Only one weight, 
which describes the relation between the commitment of a supervisor to safety and 
the perception of the commitment to safety in a team, achieved a similar large effect 
on the safety culture indicators.        
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Table 7: Results of the sensitivity analysis for the input evidence variables. The following data are shown for each input evidence variable: its 
nominal value and credibility interval, the sensitivity class (Low/Medium/High) for each safety culture indicator and a total sensitivity index (where 
values ≥4 are shaded).  
Input evidence variables Sensitivity of safety culture indicators 
No. Description Values I1.1 I2.1 I3.1 I4.1 I5.1 I5.2 I6 I7 
Total 
sensitivity 
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e1 Priority of safety-related goals in 
the role description 
0.60 
[0.50, 0.70] 
M M L M H H H H 5.5 
e4 Influence degree of controllers 
on safety arrangements 
0.50 
[0.40, 0.60] 
H L L L H H H H 5 
e7 Sufficiency of number of safety 
investigators 
0.50 
[0.40, 0.60] 
M L H H H H H H 6.5 
e8 Sufficiency of the number of 
controllers 
0.60 
[0.40, 0.80] 
H H H H H H H H 8 
e9 Availability of reliable and 
ergonomic technical systems for 
controllers 
0.75 
[0.65, 0.85] M H L L H H H H 5.5 
e10 Sufficiency and timeliness of 
training for changes 
0.60 
[0.45, 0.75] 
L L L L H H H H 4 
e11 Regularity of safety meetings 0.75 
[0.60, 0.90] 
L L L L M L H H 2.5 
e12 Developed and implemented SMS 0.60 
[0.40, 0.80] 
M M L L H H H H 5 
e14 Level of development of 
managerial skills 
0.60 
[0.40, 0.80] 
H H H H H H H L 7 
e19 Self-confidence for ATC task 0.85 
[0.75, 0.95] 
L M M M H H L L 3.5 
  
 
 
 
40 
NLR-TP-2011-030 
February 2011    
 
e20 Commitment to perform ATC 
task 
0.80 
[0.70, 0.90] 
M M L L H H L L 3 
e21 Development level of skills for 
ATC task 
0.80 
[0.70, 0.90] 
L L M L L L L M 1 
e25 Sufficiency of the number of 
maintenance personnel 
0.75 
[0.60, 0.90] 
L M H H M L L M 3.5 
e26 Quality of formal procedures for 
system checks and repairs 
0.75 
[0.60, 0.90] 
L M L L L L L L 0.5 
e35 Intensity of informal interactions 
in the team of controllers 
0.65 
[0.50, 0.80] 
L L L L L L L L 0 
e36 Quality of the formal occurrence 
assessment procedure 
0.85 
[0.75, 0.95] 
L L L L L L L L 0 
e40 Quality of the communication 
channel between controllers and 
safety investigators 
0.50 
[0.30, 0.70] L L H L L L L L 1 
e44 Average commitment to safety of 
the agents involved in safety 
analysis 
0.65 
[0.50, 0.80] L L L H M L L L 1.5 
e61 Individualism index of a 
controller 
0.8 
[0.7, 0.9] 
L L L L L L L L 0 
e62 Power distance index of a 
controller 
0.4 
[0.3, 0.5] 
L L L L L L L L 0 
e63 Masculinity index of a controller 0.15 
[0.05, 0.25] 
L L L L L L L L 0 
e64 Uncertainty avoidance index of a 
controller 
0.5 
[0.4, 0.6] 
L L L L L L L L 0 
e71 Formal support for 
confidentiality of reporting 
0.65 
[0.55, 0.75] 
L L L L L L L L 0 
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4.5.2 MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 
Based on the sensitivity analysis of the model for ANSP-3, we identified eight 
major organizational factors (MOFs) with a large effect on safety culture based on 
the input evidence variables with a total sensitivity index larger or equal than 
four in Table 7. Earlier, in the EUROCONTROL safety culture survey of ANSP-3, a 
range of safety culture issues had become clear from the results of the 
questionnaire and the safety culture workshops at ANSP-3. In coordination with 
the EUROCONTROL personnel who had performed the safety culture survey at 
ANSP-3, we compared the major organizational factors found by the sensitivity 
analysis with related issues identified in the workshops. Table 8 provides an 
overview of this comparison. It was concluded that there is some agreement for 
two factors (MOF-1, 4) and good agreement for the remaining six factors (MOF-
2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). For instance, for MOF-1 (Sufficiency of number of controllers) it 
was expressed in the survey workshops that with the current reduction in traffic 
volume there is no shortage in controller resources, but it may be a problem in 
contingency situations and in the long term. In general, the issues identified by 
the survey study provide more detailed information about the organizational 
context of the safety culture issues. For instance, in relation to MOF-2 details 
related to leadership roles, selection based on an adequate competence profile 
and coordination within the organization became clear from the survey 
workshop.  
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Table 8: Overview of the major organizational factors identified by the agent-based 
organizational model and the related issues identified in the safety culture workshops 
Major 
organizational 
factor 
Related issues identified in workshops 
MOF-1: Sufficiency 
of the number of 
controllers 
• Currently, there is a reduction in traffic volume and as such there 
is no shortage of controller resources. 
• In contingency situations, there may be insufficient controller 
resources. 
• It is recognized that the balance between safety and capacity 
may be a problem. 
• There is a lack of confidence regarding the long term planning of 
resources. 
MOF-2: Level of 
development of 
managerial skills of 
supervisors 
• There is a lack of leadership role for the supervisor to brief and 
motivate people. 
• There is a lack of authority of supervisors. 
• Not all supervisors encourage feedback on safety events. 
• The competence profile of supervisors is based on old role 
profiles, which do not reflect the current organization. 
• The selection process of supervisors is not defined according to 
an appropriate profile. 
• There is a lack of managerial skills of supervisors regarding 
interaction with their peer supervisors and the management. 
MOF-3: Sufficiency 
of the number of 
safety investigators 
• More resources on the investigation side and safety assessments 
side are required. 
• People in the organization do not well know how they can 
effectively contribute to the investigation process. 
MOF-4: Priority of 
safety-related goals 
in the role 
description 
• People in the organization believe that pressure and conflicting 
goals are obstacles that force management to set priorities that 
are not always in favour of safety. 
• Safety messages are not always well processed by the middle 
management, for instance the severity of messages may get 
diluted. 
MOF-5: Availability 
of reliable and 
ergonomic technical 
systems for 
controllers 
• The implementation of a new system was perceived as being 
rushed. 
• During the development of a new system the safety argument 
was felt to be misused. 
• The prevailing culture that ‘change is good’ is questionable. 
MOF-6: Influence of 
a controller on 
safety activities 
• Controllers do not feel they are consulted enough about major 
changes affecting safety of operations. 
• The impression that controllers’ opinions are not listened to is 
due to the fact they do not see actions deriving from the 
concerns they raise and adequate feedback about these concerns 
is not provided. 
MOF-7: Developed 
and implemented 
Safety Management 
System (SMS) 
• The SMS is seen as an asset and at an advanced level. 
• The transmission of safety concerns upwards in the organization 
does not appear to be working, nor is the top-down 
communication being effectively translated through the levels. 
MOF-8: Sufficiency 
and timeliness of 
training for changes 
• On-job-training is not optimally organized. 
• Controllers receive adequate ATC training, although the high 
number of students has meant that some of them are controlling 
together on the same sector. 
• Training issues related to changes may be underestimated. More 
realistic assessments of training requirements should be put in 
place. This is the major point in relation to training. 
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4.5.3 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENT OPTIONS 
The insights obtained by the sensitivity study can be used as basis for 
recommendations to improve the organization. In the case study, we proposed 
the following five organizational improvement options.  
OIO-1: More involvement of controllers in safety assessment for development of 
new systems and procedures (MOF-4, 5, 6) 
(a) Controllers should be more involved in safety assessments for 
development of new systems and procedures.  
(b) These safety assessments should have a sufficiently broad scope such 
that the variability in the working context of the controllers is addressed 
in a way that is well recognized and understood by the controllers 
involved in the assessment.  
(c) The assessment should explicitly address the consideration of capacity 
versus safety in nominal and non-nominal conditions. 
OIO-2: Improve workload of controllers by developing explicit rules for balancing 
safety and capacity in nominal and non-nominal conditions (MOF-1, 4) 
(a) The workload of controllers should be improved by explicit guidelines 
that support the supervisors and the controllers in balancing safety and 
capacity. 
(b) These guidelines should be determined in a safety assessment as 
indicated in OIO-1 with involvement of controllers.  
(c) A result of these guidelines may be that the number of controllers should 
increase.  
OIO-3: Improve the quality of management by supervisors (MOF-2) 
(a) The quality of the management by supervisors should be improved.  
(b) The quality of management may be improved by further development of 
the managerial skills and techniques of supervisors.  
(c) The quality of management may be improved by developing clear 
guidelines that support supervisors in their decisions for dealing with 
capacity-safety issues in nominal and non-nominal conditions. The 
development of such guidelines may be achieved in coordination with 
OIO-1 and OIO-2. 
OIO-4: Improve coherence and communication in the safety management system 
(MOF-3, 7) 
(a) The coherence and communication in the safety management system 
should be improved.  
(b) Improvement of the coherence means that safety assessment (prior 
operation) and safety monitoring (during operation) should be more 
consistent, such that safety indicators and safety requirements 
formulated in the safety assessment are well captured in the safety 
monitoring phase. 
(c) Improvement of the communication means, on the one hand, that voicing 
about safety issues is encouraged, and on the other hand, that that there 
should be a structured way to always provide feedback on the safety 
issues raised (either prior or during operation). Therefore, OIO-4 should 
be addressed in good coordination with OIO-1.  
OIO-5: Improve the communication about and training for changes (MOF-8) 
(a) The communication about changes to systems, procedures or working 
conditions should be improved. 
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(b) Appropriate training should be considered for changes to systems, 
procedures or working conditions.  
(c) In such communication and training there should be reference to the 
conclusions of the safety assessments conducted in line with OIO-1, 
explaining the reasons for the change and its assessed impact. 
 
It was concluded in the safety culture model workshop that the organizational 
improvement options of the model-based study are consistent with the 
recommendations of the survey study. The recommendations of the survey study 
tend to reflect the larger detail in the organizational context as has emerged in 
the survey workshops at ANSP-3. In addition to the list of consistent 
recommendations, the survey study identified a number of recommendations 
that are not or only partly addressed in the model-based study. 
Recommendations that were not addressed reflect aspects that are out of the 
scope of the model, e.g. on-the-job-training or learning processes of the 
Engineering department. Recommendations that were only partly addressed 
mostly reflect aspects for which the organizational context is known in more 
detail via the workshops at ANSP-3.  
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5 DISCUSSION 
The onset of this paper described the need for methods towards a better 
understanding of the implications of the material aspects of an organization for 
safety culture as well as their interactions with the immaterial characteristics. To 
this end we developed an agent-based organizational modelling approach that 
considers the formal organization as well as the value- and belief-driven 
behaviour of individuals in this organization, and that facilitates simulation-
based analysis. The model was developed for and applied to the organization of 
safety occurrence reporting and processing of reported occurrences at a 
particular West-European Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP-3) and the model 
results were compared with reference results of a EUROCONTROL safety culture 
survey study of ANSP-3. Next, Section 5.1 discusses the achieved model results 
and Section 5.2 discusses the possibilities of organizational modelling for safety 
culture analysis. 
 
5.1 ACHIEVED MODEL RESULTS 
In summary, the following results were obtained in the three study phases: 
• In Phase 1, the input values of the model were completely based on 
organizational information available prior to the survey questionnaire results. 
The model predicted safety culture indicators which were mostly higher than 
the survey questionnaire results. In particular, for six out of the seven 
relevant indicators a higher class was predicted by the model. 
• In Phase 2, the input values of the model were based on a combination of 
organizational information and survey questionnaire results. The model 
predicted safety culture indicators which were mostly equal to the survey 
questionnaire results. In particular, for six out of seven indicators the same 
class was predicted by the model. 
• In Phase 3, major organizational factors affecting the safety culture indicators 
and related organizational improvement options were inferred from a 
sensitivity analysis of the organizational model. Next these results were 
compared with safety culture issues and recommendations stemming from 
safety culture survey workshops. The major organizational factors and 
organizational improvement options identified by the model-based 
sensitivity study were largely consistent with the safety culture issues and the 
recommendations arrived at via the workshops in the survey study. The 
survey results included more details of the organizational context and 
revealed some additional aspects that were out of the scope in the 
organizational model. 
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Comparing the results of Phases 1 and 2, there is a clear difference in the 
attained consistency between the survey questionnaire and model results. This 
difference is due to the differences in the values of the input evidence variables 
of the model. The overall higher values used in Phase 1 led to safety culture 
indicator classes that were mostly higher in Phase 1 than in Phase 2, and that 
were mostly inconsistent with the survey questionnaire results in Phase 1 and 
mostly consistent in Phase 2. The (higher) values of the evidence input variables 
in Phase 1 were based on organizational information stemming from interviews 
with a safety manager and a safety investigator at ANSP-3, and from the SMS of 
ANSP-3. The (lower) values of the evidence input variables in Phase 2 were based 
on the questionnaire-aggregated opinions of a large number of employees with a 
variety of roles.  
 
The consistent results in Phase 2 show that the model structure and other 
parameters are such that the agent-based organizational model can predict the 
safety culture indicators reasonably well. In other words, given part of the data 
on the attitudes of a broad set of people in the organization, the integrated 
material and immaterial characteristics have been represented such in the model, 
that it predicted the safety culture indicators that are consistent with another 
part of the attitude dataset. This provides a positive indication of the validity of 
the organizational model. Nevertheless, a limitation of this comparison is that 
both the reference outputs and the evidence input values were based on the 
survey questionnaire results. Although different questions were used for these 
two classes, the responses to groups of questions reflect similar tendencies in 
safety culture dimensions at ANSP-3, and as such the values for the inputs and 
reference outputs may have been correlated. In addition to Phase 2, the 
comparison in Phase 3 using independent data sources is therefore important to 
obtain a more complete view.  
 
The results in Phase 3 show that the outcomes based on the sensitivity analysis 
of the model are mostly consistent with the results of the safety culture survey 
workshops. Both the model and the workshop used results of the survey 
questionnaire as input, but the processes for achieving their results were 
completely different and independent. As such, the consistency in their results 
indicates that the organizational model well captured key aspects of the safety 
culture. The observed limitation in the detail of the organizational context and 
the scope of the model results is, on the one hand, a fundamental modelling 
issue, in the sense that a model is always an abstraction of reality and it focuses 
on selected aspects. On the other hand, the range of organizational aspects that 
are considered in detail in the model may be enhanced, as is discussed in Section 
5.2.  
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5.2 ORGANIZATIONAL MODELLING FOR SAFETY CULTURE ANALYSIS  
We developed and applied an agent-based organizational modelling approach 
for the analysis of safety culture. Such agent-based modelling is a new approach 
in safety culture research. Core reasons for taking an agent-based modelling 
approach are that it is well capable of representing individuals in an organization 
and that it takes into account the beliefs, values and norms of such individuals 
that form an important basis of the organizational and safety culture. The 
beliefs, values and norms of individuals are influenced by and/or have effect on 
the processes, goals, policies and structures of the organization. Thus the 
integration of material and immaterial characteristics of organizational culture 
takes place at the level of the individual.  
 
This focus on the individual in the agent-based organizational modelling can be 
contrasted with recently developed organizational models with an emphasis on 
system dynamics (SD), such STAMP [53] and SoTeRiA [56]. In general, SD models 
tend to abstract from single events, entities and actors of organizations and to 
use an aggregate view on the organizational dynamics. On the one hand, using 
such aggregate views may be simpler as it restricts the model complexity by 
focusing on presumed key aspects in the organization. On the other hand, it may 
be difficult to map actual organizational structures and processes to abstract 
aggregated model variables. By doing so, the link to the behaviour of 
organizational individuals and their interactions may be lost, such that the level 
of analysis is reduced. Moreover, a high complexity of social dynamics of 
interacting organizational actors may result in unexpected emergent effects in 
the organization, which may not be observed in models using aggregated 
organizational views. In this paper we showed that in spite of the modelling 
complexity it is feasible to develop an agent-based organizational model that 
provides predictions consistent with survey-based results. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of agents in the organizational modelling, it is 
only one of the views of the applied multi-view hybrid organizational modelling 
framework [52] and its three other views are needed to describe the formal 
organizational context in which the agents perform. In particular, these other 
views describe organizational aspects such as the organization of roles, authority 
relations, responsibility relations, goals, performance indicators, tasks and 
processes. A wide repertoire of organizational perspectives thus helps to perform 
the analysis from a broad scope without neglecting possibly relevant 
organizational aspects prematurely. Furthermore, it helps assuring that the 
agents’ behaviour is considered in a valid organizational context, i.e. a context 
that well represents the structures and processes of the organization under 
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study. The multi-view organizational modelling [52] supported a suitable 
representation of the formal organizational context in the case study, such as 
indicated by the largely consistent predictions obtained.         
 
For the development and use of the model, information on both the material and 
the immaterial characteristics of an organization is needed. Information on the 
material characteristics (such as roles, processes, responsibilities) can be 
obtained by e.g. management documentation, process observation or interviews; 
in the case study we used documentation of the SMS and interviews on the ways 
of working. Information on the immaterial characteristics (values, beliefs, norms) 
is more difficult to obtain. As noted in the Introduction questionnaires are 
predominantly used in safety culture research to reveal related attitudes of 
people in the organization. In the case study questionnaire-based information 
was used as model input and on this basis consistent model predictions of the 
safety culture indicators could be achieved, as discussed in Section 5.1. This 
research is not focused on the quest for the best way to reveal values, beliefs and 
norms of people in the organization, but it manifests that information on these 
immaterial characteristics is essential model input. After all, organizations with 
similar material characteristics may have different organizational cultures.      
 
The case study showed that the model could achieve predictions of safety culture 
indicators that are consistent with questionnaire-based indicators. However, the 
aim of the organizational modelling is not the prediction of safety culture 
indicators as such. As discussed in the previous paragraph, information on 
immaterial characteristics is necessary model input and thus the added value of 
the prediction of indicators using the same type of information would be low. 
The aim of the modelling is to improve the understanding of the relations 
between the material and immaterial characteristics of safety culture, as a basis 
for structured determination of ways towards better safety culture. The logical 
structure of the organizational model offers the basis to systematically reason 
about the complex relations between aspects of the formal organization and the 
behaviour, values and beliefs of actors in the organization. As the organizational 
model considers a variety of complex interactions, such as agent relations, 
dynamics, stochasticity and feedback loops, computer simulations are needed to 
evaluate the resulting behaviour of the model. The results of such simulations 
provide insights in the relations between material and immaterial characteristics 
of organizational culture and can be used to evaluate various organizational 
(improvement) scenarios. As an example, the studied case showed the effective 
use of a sensitivity analysis to identify organizational factors that have a strong 
impact on safety culture. 
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Based on above findings, the proposed organizational modelling approach can 
be considered as part of a set of safety culture analysis methods, which 
specifically aims at an integrated and systematic evaluation of material and 
immaterial characteristics of socio-technical organizations. By using this 
approach an organization is able to gain a deeper understanding of causes of 
diverse problems and inefficiencies both in the formal organization and in the 
behaviour of organizational agents, and to systematically identify and evaluate 
improvement options. Given the broad perspective of the organizational 
modelling framework, such improvement options may cover a broad range, e.g. 
roles, responsibilities, goals, processes, working conditions (some specific 
examples achieved in the case study are listed in Section 0), thus promoting 
organizational learning at various levels and beyond single-loop learning. The 
effects of organizational changes may be evaluated by follow-up analyses, using 
feedback of attitudes and other related organizational performance indicators. 
Such feedback may also support further improvement of the organizational 
model. 
 
The application of the modelling approach is not a free lunch. It requires a good 
understanding of the modelling methods and their bases in organization theory, 
social psychology and cognitive science, as well as a considerable effort to 
analyse and formalize relevant aspects of the material and immaterial 
characteristics of the organization. In addition, the performance of model 
simulations requires that appropriate values need to be determined for large 
number of parameters and by the nature of the modelling the uncertainty of 
these parameter values may well be high. In the sensitivity analysis of the case 
study it was illustrated how the Monte Carlo filtering technique is able to select 
the most important factors in spite of the uncertainty in the parameter values. 
 
This paper presented a new agent-based organizational modelling approach for 
integrated and systematic evaluation of material and immaterial characteristics of 
a socio-technical organization in safety culture analysis. Future developments 
may further strengthen and broaden the approach. Such enhancements may 
include: 
• Extension of the set of agent modelling constructs to allow evaluation of a 
broader range of safety culture issues. For instance, trust-related safety 
culture issues may be evaluated using trust modelling approaches from 
[77][78]; issues related to emotions and feelings can be addressed by 
techniques from [79][80]. 
• More direct coupling of the organizational modelling with other safety culture 
analysis methods. For instance, development of safety culture questionnaires 
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with questions that are directly linked to variables in the model or that are 
based on important issues identified by the model; preparation of safety 
culture workshops on the basis of organizational factors identified by the 
model. 
• Broadening the scope of the modelling. For instance, in the case study the 
model development was focused on the occurrence reporting cycle and other 
processes such as management actions, engineering activities and traffic 
management actions by controllers were modelled at a high (abstract) level. 
The level of modelling detail of such other processes may be enhanced, thus 
enabling more specific results for these organizational layers and the air 
traffic control operations.   
• Coupling of organizational modelling to risk modelling may provide a future 
way for structured analysis of the effect of safety culture on safety 
performance. A stimulus of safety culture studies is the premise that a good 
safety culture has a positive effect on the safety risk of the work performed at 
the organization; for an ANSP this would mean that better safety culture 
supports lower ATM-related risk levels. A way forward for the analysis of this 
important link consists of modelling of the effect of safety culture on the way 
operations are being performed, and next, assessing the risk of the safety 
culture influenced performance by risk modelling methods that explicitly 
account for the performance of human operators, e.g. as has been done in 
agent-based dynamic risk modelling [57][58]. Such modelling allows for 
explicitly arguing about relations between safety culture and safety 
performance, which can be supported by sensitivity analysis at the level of 
safety risks. 
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